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Insurance companies routinely request certain information from
applicants for all forms of insurance. This information is needed to help in
evaluating the risks to be covered by the insurer and to set appropriate
premium rates. However, when a claim is made for the benefits of the
policy, the insurer may sometimes discover that the insured misrepresented
certain material facts in the application for the insurance. The
misrepresentation may be in the form of an incomplete or false answer to a
question on the application or rather the concealment of certain facts. The
misrepresentation may be intentional with a purpose to deceive, or it may
be merely an innocent and inadvertent mistake.
When a misrepresentation is discovered, the insurer is presumably
entitled to deny the claim under the policy and rescind the policy.1
Rescission has the effect of making the policy void ab initio; in other words,
the policy was never in effect.2 Ordinarily, it would be against public policy
"to permit a dishonest insured to recover, [since] insurers would [then]
include the cost of that risk in premiums charged to honest insureds."3
II. WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS ALLOWED FOR RESCISSION OF A
POLICY OR DENIAL OF A CLAIM?
There are four possible bases for allowing an insurer to rescind or deny
liability:
1. Any material misrepresentation
2. Intent to deceive or a material misrepresentation
3. Intent to deceive or an increase in the risk of loss
4. Intent to deceive and materiality
Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. A.B., Harvard University, 1950; C.L.U.
American College of Life Underwriters 1957; J.D., John Marshall Law School, 1966. The valuable
contributions of my very capable research assistants, Tiffany Karem, Lori Berko, and Alison Hayden are
gratefully acknowledged.
I See, e.g., 17 AM.JUR. 2D, Automobile Insurance S 53 (2004).
2 Bennett v. Hedglin, 995 P.2d 668, 672-73 (Alaska 2000).
3 Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098, 1108 (N.J. 1994).
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A. Any Material Misrepresentation
In many states, any material misrepresentation is grounds for rescission
or denial of liability. This is true whether the misrepresentation is made
intentionally, knowingly, negligently, or innocently.4 There need not be any
showing of fraud or intent to deceive.5
B. Intent To Deceive Or A Material Misrepresentation
In some states the standard for rescission or denial of a claim is that a
misrepresentation "shall have been made with actual intent to deceive or
materially affects either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by
the company."6 On its face, this would seem to allow rescission or denial
based solely on intent to deceive and without regard to materiality.
However, in my more than 50 years of involvement with insurance, first as
an agent and broker and later as an attorney and teacher, I have never seen or
heard of a case which allowed rescission or denial based solely on intent to
4 Carroll v. Metro. Ins. and Annuity Co., 166 F.3d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying
Mississippi law); Modisette v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 427 P.2d 21, 25 (N.M. 1967).
5 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manzo, 584 A.2d 190, 195 (N.J. 1991). See also Courtney v.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that innocent
misrepresentation is sufficient to allow rescission); Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Nittolo, 955 F.
Supp. 331, 333 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding that an insurer need not prove intent to defraud; even innocent
misrepresentationjustifies rescission); Arnersonv. Gardner, 681 So. 2d 570, 572-73 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(finding that an insurer may void a policy even if misrepresentation was unintentional); McQuay v. Ark.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 98 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) ("incorrect statement may justify
rescission regardless of whether it was made with fraudulent intent"); Davis v.John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 413 S.E.2d 224,226 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (issuingjudgment for insurer even though "applicant
may have acted in good faith, not knowing that a representation is untrue"); Fernandez v. Windsor Life
Ins. Co. of America, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 357, 364 (N.Y. Trial Term 1975) (stating that an "insured is bound
by the representations contained in the application whether these statements were deliberately or
innocently made.").
6 Methodist Med. Ctr. of lll. v. Am. Med. Sec., 38 F.3d 316,319-20 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 215
I11. Comp. Stat. 5/154 (2005)) which provides:
No misrepresentation or false warranty made by the insured or in his behalf in the negotiation
for a policy of insurance, or breach of a condition of such policy shall defeat or avoid the
policy or prevent its attaching unless such misrepresentation, false warranty or condition shall
have been stated in the policy or endorsement or rider attached thereto, or in the written
application therefore.
No such misrepresentation or false warranty shall defeat or avoid the policy unless it shall
have been made with actual intent to deceive or materially affects either the acceptance of the
risk or the hazard assumed by the company.
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deceive. Instead, it appears that where an intent to deceive is found, less
materiality may be required for the rescission or denial of a claim.
C. Intent To Deceive OrAn Increase In The Risk Of Loss
In some states a misrepresentation will not be deemed material unless
it increases the risk of loss. 7 This is a more restrictive standard for the
insurer because a fact may be material to that insurer even though it does not
demonstrably increase the risk of loss. For example, some religious and
fraternal organizations offer insurance coverage only to their members; thus
the fact of membership is material to that insurer.8
D. Intent To Deceive And A Material Misrepresentation
In some states, an insurer wishing to rescind or deny a claim must meet
a difficult standard. In addition to proving materiality, an insurer must also
prove that the misrepresentation was knowingly false, and sometimes he or
she must exceed the knowingly false standard and establish that it was made
with intent to deceive. 9
While there would appear to be a clear distinction between requiring
materiality and intent to deceive as opposed to materiality or intent to
deceive, some courts employing the "or" standard find ways to reach results
that are the same as if they had openly applied the "and" standard." These
7 See Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chiu, 21 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); see also NW. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. lannacchino, 950 F. Supp. 28, 31 (D. Mass. 1997).
8 E.g., The Aid Association for Lutherans; College Life Ins. Co.; malpractice coverage for
members of a state medical or Bar association.
9 Vining v. Ent. Fin. Group, Inc., 148 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that, under
Oklahoma law, there must be "a finding of intent to deceive before an insurer can avoid the policy...
[A] statement made without intent to deceive is not a misrepresentation at all . . . ." (citing Okla. Stat.
tit. 36, S 3609)); Friez v. Nat'I Old Line Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1983) (in Montana, must
show intention to mislead); McBean v. Guardian Ins. Agency, 52 F. Supp. 2d 518, 521 (V.I. 1999)
(finding that insurer must prove that insureds acted with intent to deceive); Clyde A. Wilson Int'l.
Investigations, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 959 F. Supp. 756,761 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (insurer must plead and
prove that misrepresentation was made "willfully and with design to deceive or defraud."); Jung v.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 949 F. Supp. 353, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (discussing insured who knew
that representation was false, or insured made representation in bad faith); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. v.
Seafirst Corp., 662 F. Supp. 36, 39-40 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (explaining that Washington statute provides
that no misrepresentation shall avoid the contract unless it was made with intent to deceive); Francois
v. Alexander, 771 So. 2d 656, 660 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that an insurer may deny coverage only
if misrepresentation was made with intent to deceive); Bishop v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 421 N.W.
2d 423, 425 (Neb. 1988) (holding that there must be proof of intent to deceive to deny recovery).
10 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law S 102, at 528-30 (1987).
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courts seem to sympathize with an insured where it appears that the insured
made an innocent mistake and would suffer hardship under the application
of the "or" standard. Such courts stretch the facts to find that what appears
to be a misstatement was not really false or, even if false, was not material,
or that the insurer did not really rely on the misstatement in underwriting
and issuing the policy."
A strong argument can be made that an insurer should not be allowed
to deny a claim or rescind a policy unless a misrepresentation in the
application is both material and was knowingly false, or was made with intent
to deceive. If this standard is applied, insureds that make innocent or
negligent misrepresentations on insurance applications will not be penalized
for their errors. The cost of doing this will be borne by the diligent or lucky
insurance buyers who do not unintentionally misrepresent, or do not have
a claim, or whose misrepresentation is not discovered. Is this fair? Most
people are capable of forgetting facts at the time they apply for insurance,
especially if those facts relate to a condition or event in the past which is no
longer (and perhaps never was) deemed a problem by the applicant. Most
insurance policies do not exclude coverage for unintentional or negligent
acts of the insured, and most insureds probably don't expect to lose their
coverage for an unintentional misrepresentation.
How difficult will it be for courts to determine if a misrepresentation
was "knowingly false" or made with an "intent to deceive"? Such
determinations are frequently made in tort and criminal cases. However,
there well may be a strong sympathy by both judges and jurors for an
insured claimant who will be saddled with a huge loss if the
misrepresentation is found to have been knowingly false. It may be that
such a finding will be made only when the evidence of fraud is very strong.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES A MISREPRESENTATION?
A. Definitions
A misrepresentation in an application for insurance is "a statement of
something as a fact which is untrue and affects the risk undertaken by the
insurer.' 12 "Incomplete answers or a failure to disclose material information
on an application for insurance may constitute a misrepresentation when the
omission prevents the insurer from adequately assessing the risk involved."' 3
I! Id.
12 Methodist Med. Ctr. of 111. v Am. Med. Sec., 38 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted).
13 Id. at 320 (citation omitted). See also New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Ill, in DuPage,
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B. Is There A Voluntary Duty For An Applicant To Disclose?
Many centuries ago a rule requiring voluntary full disclosure of all
relevant information was established in regard to ocean marine insurance.
14
It was a rule of necessity; the insurer had no access to the information and
had to rely completely on the applicant. 5 The rule appears to have
continued to the present day for marine insurance," but it is not applied to
other forms of insurance." In other lines of insurance, it's usually held that
the applicant has no duty to disclose unless he is asked;' 8 the assumption is
that an applicant can assume that facts are not material if the insurer fails to
inquire.' 9
C. How Specific Must A Disclosure Be?
It seems clear that, where the applicant has disclosed some information
that might raise questions about his insurability, the insurer must follow up
any leads it has. If there is sufficient information to put the insurer on
warning, it should investigate further. "[A] n insurance company cannot rely
on [a misrepresentation] to rescind the policy if facts were known that
would cause a prudent insurer 'to start an inquiry, which, if carried out with
reasonable thoroughness, would reveal the truth.'"'2
994 F. Supp. 970,976 (N.D. I11. 1998) (citations omitted) ("An incomplete answer or a failure to disclose
material information in response to a question can constitute a misrepresentation."); Fernandez v.
Windsor Life Ins. Co. of Am., 372 N.Y.S. 2d 357, 363 (Sup. Ct. Trial Term 1975) ("[A] failure to
disclose in response to a particular question is as much a misrepresentation as a disclosure that is a
mistruth or a halftruth.").




18 When the gender for a personal pronoun could be either male or female, I use the masculine
pronoun generically, due to habit and my masculine personal orientation. By doing so I avoid the rather
awkward "he or she" and the grammatically incorrect "they." I trust that female authors will balance the
scales on the other side.
19 Fernandez v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F. 2d 559, 567 n.32 (11th Cir. 1990); Mattox
v. W. Fid. Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 210,216 (N.D. Miss. 1988).
20 Carroll v. Metro. Ins. & Annuity Co., 166 F. 3d 802, 806 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying Miss. law)
(citation omitted).
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D. Should The Courts Impute Negligence Or Knowledge Of An
Insurance Agent To The Insurer?
It is generally held that knowledge held by an insurer's agent will be
imputed to the insurer, regardless of whether the agent actually
communicates the information to the insurer. This view is based on the idea
that an applicant will assume that the agent knows what information the
insurer is seeking and how best to communicate that information to the
insurer.21 In some states the insurer is bound by what the applicant orally
tells the agent regardless of what the agent writes on the application.22 In
other states, the insured is bound by what is written on the application,
regardless of who filled it in.23 Even in the latter states, an exception is
usually recognized if the insurer's agent induced the applicant to sign the
application without reading it.24  Therefore, in Rutherford v. Prudential
Insurance Company ofAmerica,2 the court found that the insurer's medical
examiner had led the insured to believe that certain information as to his
medical history, which was not included in the application filled out by the
doctor, was not essential.26 It reasonably could be inferred "that [the doctor]
21 Marionjoy Rehab. Hosp. v. Lo, 535 N.E. 2d 1061, 1064 (111. App. Ct. 1989);Johnson Int'l Co.
v.Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 431,435-36 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Wash. law).
22 Marionjoy Rehab. Hasp., 535 N.E. 2d at 1063-64. See also.Byrd v. Mut. Benefit Health & Acc.
Assn., 166 P.2d 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (detailing that insurer was estopped to assert omission of
information from application, which agent filled out and insured merely signed; the insured had no
knowledge that his answers were incorrectly recorded; he wasn't asked to read application or do anything
except sign his name; he acted in good faith and gave truthful answers to questions he was asked); Logan
v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 312 N.E. 2d 416,420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (citations omitted) ("It has long been
the rule in Illinois that when an applicant for insurance gives correct oral answers to questions
propounded by an insurance agent but the insurer's agent incorrectly records these answers the insurer
cannot rely upon the falsity of the answers to avoid the policy.").
23 Keaten v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 648 F. 2d 299,303 (5th Cir. 1981); Monarch Life Ins. Co.
v. Donahue, 708 F. Supp. 674, 676 (E.D. Pa. 1989). See also Courtney v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
179 F. Supp. 8,12 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that insured may be held responsible for misrepresentations
in application even though agent completed application which was signed by insured; even if insured
provided accurate answers to agent, he was deemed to adopt information in application when he signed
the application; applicant has duty to review application and correct incomplete or incorrect answers);
Jung v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 949 F. Supp. 2d. 353, 358 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (ruling that an
applicant can't avoid responsibility by signing blank form and leaving it to another to fill in answers);
Stuart v. Am. States Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 697, 700 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted) (finding that
insured has duty to read application and correct any misrepresentations; failure to correct becomes a
ratification).
24 Pinette v. Assur. Co. of Am., 52 F.3d 407, 410 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Conn. law).
25 44 Cal. Rptr. 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
26 Id. at 703.
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gave [the insured] the impression that the answers the doctor wrote covered
all the matters in which [the insurer] was interested, and therefore a reading
of the application by [the insured] when he later received it would not alert
him to its insufficiency."
27
E. Attach A Copy Of The Application To The Policy
It is generally held that statements in the application do not bind an
insured unless a copy of the application or the information contained therein
is attached to, or made a part of the policy. 2 On the other hand, a majority
of states hold that the insured is bound by misstatements in the application
if a copy thereof is attached to the policy.
29
The purpose of the requirement of attaching a copy of the application
is clearly to "allow for objective evidence of negotiations at the time of
application for [the] protection of the insured from possible frauds by
insurance agents in falsifying answers given by the insured in applying for
insurance."30  "[T]he insured [should] have the material terms of the
contract at hand during his lifetime in order that he might examine and
correct any misrepresentations . "3' This requirement is not only
beneficial to the insured but also to the insurer, since it means that "the
27 Id.
29 See, e.g., Lawndale Nat. Bankv. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 489 F.2d 1384, 1385-86 (7th
Cir. 1973) (striking insurer's defense of misrepresentation; I11. Ins. Code provides that no
misrepresentation "shall defeat or avoid the policy... unless such misrepresentation... shall have been
stated in the policy or endorsement or rider attached thereto, or in the written application therefore, of
which a copy is attached to or endorsed on the policy, and made a part thereof.... ."); Horowitz v. Fed.
Kemper Life Assur. Co., 946 F. Supp. 384, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that "ifan insurer fails to attach
the insurance application ... at the time the policy is delivered, the insurer is barred from asserting any
fraudulent misrepresentations contained in the application ... as justification for its failure to pay the
policy proceeds.") (citing 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441 (2005)); Irving v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 606 So.2d
1365, 1367 (La. Ct. App. 1992) ("[N]o application for life or health and accident insurance shall be
admissible in evidence... unless a correct copy of the application was attached to or otherwise made a
part of the policy.., when issued and delivered." (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 22:618 A (1978)).
29 See, e.g., Davis v.John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 413 S.E. 2d 224,226 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that "where the application for insurance is attached to and becomes a part of the policy, in
order to avoid the policy for a misrepresentation... in the application, the insurer need only show that
the representation was false and that it was material . . . ."); Mayes v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608
S.W.2d 612, 617 (Tex. 1980) (finding that insured may be conclusively presumed to have knowledge of
contents of application and to have ratified any false statements therein if application is attached to and
made part of policy and is accepted and retained by insured).
30 Gibraltar Cas. Co. v. A. Epstein & Sons, Int'l, Inc., 562 N.E. 2d 1039, 1042 (Il1. App. Ct.
1990).
31 Adams v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 797 F. Supp. 563, 565 (W.D. Tex. 1992), affid 49
F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished opinion).
110 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:103
knowledge of the insured of the statements contained in the application is
thereby conclusively established."
32
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES "MATERIAL"?
Most courts use three tests to determine materiality:
1. Is the fact deemed to be material by all similar insurers?
2. Would a reasonable and prudent insurer regard it as material?
3. Would this particular insurer regard it as material?
33
Courts uniformly hold that a representation is material if it would affect
the insurer's decision to accept or reject the application.34 Many courts add
to this minimal definition of materiality by holding that a statement is
material if it affects the nature of the risk, or the insurer's determination of
the premium or of any exclusions or limitations of coverage.3" For many
years, in my Insurance Law class, I have used a very simple example of what
is or is not material. Suppose, in an application for life insurance, an
applicant falsely states that he has not consulted a doctor recently.
Situation A: The applicant has cancer, but the doctor did not detect
it and thinks the applicant is in good health. Is the false answer
about consulting a doctor a material misrepresentation? No,
because if a true answer had been given, the insurer would have
asked for a report from the doctor, and would thereafter have issued
the policy.
Situation B: The doctor made a diagnosis of cancer, but did not tell
the patient. In fact, the diagnosis was wrong, and the patient was in
32 Id. at 565 (quotingJohnson v. Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm., 519 S.W. 2d. 111, 114 (Tex. 1975)).
33 Merchs. Fire Assur. Corp. v. Lattimore, 263 F.2d 232, 241 (9th Cir. 1959).
34 See, e.g., Dorsey v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 868, 873-74 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(holding that if insurer had known applicant's true health condition it would not have provided any
coverage); Matilla v. Farmers New World Life Ins., 960 F. Supp. 223, 225-26 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (ruling
that insurer's underwriters "would not issue a policy to an applicant who did not have a valid visa;"
insurer was concerned about deportation, and visits to unstable countries where health care might be
inadequate; also, visa validation process often led to discovery of pre-existing health problems).
35 See, e.g., Pinette v. Assur. Co. of Am., 52 F.3d 407, 411 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that prior
loss history is material as to issuance of policy, or rate of premium); York Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 746
A.2d 906, 909 (Me. 2000) (facts "would have influenced... [acceptance of] the risk, ... the premium
rate,. - . the amount of... coverage, or in providing coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the
loss."); Case v. RGA Ins. Servs., 521 S.E. 2d 32, 33-34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (insurer would not have
issued policy, would "not have issued a policy in as large an amount or at the given rate, or would not
have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss."); Farley v. St. Charles Ins.
Agency, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (might have influenced acceptance of risk or
premium charged).
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good health. Is the answer now a material misrepresentation? Yes,
because the insurer would have asked for a report from the doctor,
learned of his diagnosis of cancer, and refused to issue the policy.
V. MUST THERE BE A CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN FACT
MISREPRESENTED AND CAUSE OF DEATH OR LOSS?
In most jurisdictions, a misrepresentation is considered material and
sufficient grounds for rescission or denial of a claim regardless of whether
the fact misrepresented has any causal connection with the death or loss
involved in the claim. 6 A small minority ofjurisdictions require that, in
order to establish materiality, the insurer must also prove that the facts
misrepresented in the application contributed to the loss on which the claim
is based.3" There is a very sound reason for not requiring a causal
connection: such a requirement may encourage fraud. If a loss is caused by
something other than the fact misrepresented, there will be coverage. If the
cause of loss is connected to the misrepresented fact, the insured has lost
nothing, because he wouldn't have had coverage anyway. If the cause of loss
is not connected, he has coverage he otherwise couldn't have obtained.
Thus, he had nothing to lose by misrepresenting.
36 See, e.g., Carroll v. Metro. Ins. and Annuity Co., 166 F.3d 802, 807 n.18 (5th Cir. 1999) (ruling
that Mississippi law does not require that actual cause of death be related to risks concealed); Davies v.
Centennial Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 934, 943 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that misrepresentation need not be
connected with or related to illness or injury); Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Nittolo, 955 F. Supp. 331,
335 (D.N.J. 1997) (citation omitted) (holding that false statements need not relate to ultimate claim);
Unger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 242 N.E.2d 907, 910 (I11. App. Ct. 1968) (finding that misrepresentation
need not "be one with regard to a matter upon which a claim is later predicated."); Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Manzo, 584 A.2d 190, 196-97 (N.J. 1991) (stating that a majority ofjurisdictions accept the general
rule that in the absence of a statute establishing a different rule, there need be no causal connection
between the cause of death and the misrepresentation); Carroll v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 414 S.E.2d
777, 778 (S.C. 1992) ("The majority rule is that there is no requirement that the loss be causally related
to the material misrepresentation under a void insurance policy." (citing JOHN J. APPLEMAN, ET AL.,
INSURANCE LAW& PRACTICE S 245 (Rev. ed. 1972)); Berger v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of St. Paul,
Minn., 723 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1986) (holding that insurer need not prove that fact misrepresented
resulted in insured's death).
37 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. S 40-418 (2003); Mo. REV. STAT. S 376.580 (2004); R.I. GEN.
LAWS S 27-4-10 (2003); see also Kathryn H. Vratil & Stacy M. Andreas, The Misrepresentation Defense in
Causal Relation States: A Primer, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 832, 834-52 (1991) (listing also Arizona, Arkansas,
Nebraska, New Jersey and Oklahoma).
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VI. EFFECT OF AN INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE
Most property and casualty insurance policies are written for relatively
short periods of coverage-commonly one, three, or five years. Usually the
insurer will have a right to rescind the policy or deny a claim if there has
been a material misrepresentation in the application for insurance. On the
other hand, life and health insurance policies are usually written for a longer
term of coverage, often for the lifetime of the insured.
Life insurers introduced incontestability clauses toward the end of the
nineteenth century.38 These clauses "dispel[led] the public's fear that
insurers would not honor claims if the insured had made a technical mistake
in the application."39 By the early 1900s, statutes in many states mandated
"that certain insurance policies be incontestable."40 The purpose of these
statutes was "to give the insured a sense of security after the stated period
elapses."4'
Obviously, people with medical problems may be faced with a difficult
conflict of interest in applying for life and health insurance. If they give full
and honest answers to the questions in the application, they may be rejected
for the desired coverage, be charged a higher premium, or their medical
condition may be excluded from coverage. However, if they misrepresent
or conceal their medical problems, and survive for the prescribed period,
they will have full coverage thereafter. For some, the temptation is
irresistible.
The modem incontestable clause is usuallyvery similar to the following:
"After this policy has been in force for a period of two years during the lifetime
of the insured, it shall become incontestable as to the statements contained in
the copy of the application." The italicized phrase is important, because it
means that if the insured dies within the specified period, the policy will
never become incontestable. This avoids the common situation where the
insured dies near the end of the contestable period and the
misrepresentation is not discovered until later. Thus, the insurer is assured
a reasonable time in which to investigate.
Incontestable clauses serve valuable public interests. Much costly
litigation is eliminated, insurers' expenses are reduced, and resolution of
38 An incontestable clause provides that, after the policy has been in force for a specified period
(usually one or two years), the insurer can no longer contest the validity of the policy, even if there were
misstatements in the application.
39 Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098, 1102 (N.J. 1994).
40 Id. (citations omitted).
41 Id. (citations omitted).
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conflicts does not depend on evidence that is stale or nonexistent years after
the policy took effect. Therefore, both insureds and beneficiaries can feel
secure that their claims will not be denied in the future.42
Some states allow an insurer to choose between two statutory
alternatives for the incontestable clause.43 The first alternative clause is
absolute: the policy will become incontestable for any reason. The second
alternative clause allows an exception for fraudulent misstatements in the
application. Thus, the policy may always be contested on grounds of
intentional or knowing misrepresentation in the application.44 It is difficult
to understand why any insurer would choose the absolute incontestable
clause rather than the clause with a fraud exception. It is sometimes
suggested that the most likely reason is increased marketability.45 But what
honest buyer would care about a fraud exception? An even more puzzling
question is what insurer would want to insure people who wanted to be
rewarded for their fraud?
In any case, is the presence of any incontestable clause really of any value
to an insurer in the marketing of life and health insurance? In her Note,
Katherine Cooper suggested that "insurance agents undoubtedly point out
the clause to potential buyers and explain that coverage may not be denied
after a period of time."' I was an insurance producer for twenty years, and
have been involved in insurance in various ways for more than fifty years.
I never even mentioned the incontestable clause to a client, nor did a client
ever ask me about it. I also have never heard of any insurance producer
using the clause as a saleable, valuable feature of a policy-or indeed
mentioning the clause at all.
It is sometimes argued by a beneficiary that, if death occurs during the
contestable period, the amount of proceeds payable should be reduced to
what would have been payable for the premium dollars paid, if it appears
that, had the insurer known the insured's true medical history, it would have
issued a policy at a higher premium. 47 While this approach may be tempting
at first glance, the obvious fallacy was clearly pointed out by the Hays court.
That court held "[i]f the only consequence of a fraudulent
42 See Maxwell v. Cumberland Life Ins. Co., 748 P.2d 392, 395-97 (Idaho 1987).
43 See Kaufman v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 681 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citing
FLA. STA. ANN. § 627.607 (West 2005)).
See, e.g., FLA. STA. ANN. S 627.607 (West 2005).
45 See Katherine Cooper, Liar's Poker: The Effect of Incontestability Clauses After Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co. v. Haas, 1 CONN. INS. L.J. 225, 233 (1995).
46 Id. at 233-34.
47 Hays v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 583, 590 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying Okla. law).
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misrepresentation in a life insurance application is to reduce the amount
paid under the policy, there is every incentive for applicants to lie."48
Insurance contracts often include a provision called the Age Adjustment
Clause. Such a clause provides that where an insured has misstated his or
her age in the application, that the benefit to be paid is reduced to the
amount that could have been purchased by that premium at the insured's
correct age. This is not an exception to the incontestable clause because the
insurer is not contesting the validity of the policy. Rather, the insurer is
simply enforcing the policy as written. The rationale for including this
clause is that a misstatement of age is usually unintentional, and does not
injure the insurer if the coverage can be appropriately adjusted. Some
people, especially those born in foreign countries, honestly do not know
when they were born; others have lied about their age for so long that they
honestly believe their "adopted" age.49
VII. CONTESTABILITY OF PROPERTY AND CASUALTY POLICIES
A. Does An Insurer Have A Duty To Investigate?
It is generally held that "[a] n insurance company has the right to expect
a prospective insured to give truthful information on the application, and the
insurance company normally has no duty to inquire further into whether an
insured has told the truth on the application."60 It is also generally held that
an insurer may still rely on the applicant's representations even if it does
carry out some investigation of its own."' If, however, an insurer obtains
some information that might cause it to question the information provided
by the applicant, it will usually be held to have a duty to investigate further.2
48 Id. (quoting N.Y. Life. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 923 F.2d 279, 284 (3d Cir. 1991)).
49 A classic example is the case of a very well known movie star whose birthday is recognized
each year in the Almanac column in the CHIcAGO TRIBUNE. Her year of birth is always listed as 1934.
However, she entered the University ofWisconsin as a freshman in 1948, and her two roommates, both
friends of mine, were born in 1930. Apparently the Hollywood star understated her age early in her
career and it was never corrected.
50 Amerson v. Gardner, 681 So. 2d 507, 573 (Ala. Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). See also,
Foster v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 703 N.E.2d 657, 660 (Ind. 1998) (holding that an insurer has no duty
to investigate or cross-check, and that to so require would "generate additional costs to insurers and no
legitimate benefit to insureds.").
51 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cronin, 51 A.2d 2, 5 (N.J. 1947).
52 Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 651 A.2d 92, 97 (N.J. 1995) (citation omitted).
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B. First Party Claims
Courts are sometimes very liberal in imputing information to an insurer,
which will then negate a claim of misrepresentation by the insured. For
example, in Graphic Arts Mutual Insurance Company v. Pritchett,53 an applicant
answered "no" to a question as to whether he had had any insurance policies
cancelled within the past three years. In fact, he had had three such
cancellations, including one policy with the corporate parent of Graphic
Arts. Both the new policy and the cancelled policy were sold by the same
insurance agency through two different agents.54 The court held that
Graphic Arts thus had actual knowledge of the misrepresentation, because
its agent, the corporate insurance agency, was aware of the previous
cancellation. Therefore, Graphic Arts was estopped from asserting the
misrepresentation .
5
Another rather extreme example of estoppel based on the imputation of
knowledge to an insurer can be found in Violin v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company.56 The applicants falsely answered "no" to a question on the
application: "Has any company ever refused or cancelled insurance?"" In
fact, four years earlier the same insurer, Fireman's Fund, had cancelled a
policy which it had issued to the same insureds covering musical
instruments. "The lower court found that [the insureds'] misrepresentation
was material to the risk against which the applicants sought coverage and was
not innocently made."5 8 Therefore, the insureds were denied recovery for
the loss of the insured violin.5 9 The Nevada Supreme Court reversed
because the insurer's claim department in Los Angeles had "a record of the
prior loss and subsequent cancellation. "6 However, there was no connec-
tion between "the solicitation and issuance of the present policy" and the
claims department.61 No one "connected with the solicitation or issuance
of the present policy" was aware of the misrepresentation. 62 "[B]ecause of
the expense, volume, and complexity of its business, the insurer believed [it
could] rely upon the representations... in an application for insurance and
53 469 S.E.2d 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
54 Id. at 201.
55 Id.
56 406 P.2d 287 (Nev. 1965).
57 Id. at 288.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 289.
61 Violin, 406 P.2d at 289.
62 Id.
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[so did not have] a program for communicating information in the files of
the claims department to those in the production end of the business. "'
The Nevada Supreme Court stated that if the insurer was able "to
promptly discover the misrepresentation after the loss has occurred, [it
would] prefer that diligence be exercised at an earlier time - when the
application for insurance is taken."' The court therefore held that "the
insurer waived its power to rescind the insurance contract by issuing the
policy with knowledge that the insureds had fraudulently misrepresented a
material fact in their application for insurance." 61 In a vigorous dissent,
Judge Zenoff urged that "[t]here should not be a reward for a knowing and
willful misrepresentation."' In this case, the "knowledge" of the insurer
consisted of facts in an inactive file. The court found that issue quite
different from facts in an active file for coverage currently in force.67
While I would certainly concur with Judge Zenoff, why should waiver
or estoppel apply to information in any record, even if active? Even in this
modern electronic age, it costs something to check the records for all
applications. Why should all insureds bear this cost to benefit dishonest
applicants? If the cancellation had been by any other company, it could not
have been discovered. Why reward those insureds merely because they
possess the impudence to apply again to the same company that cancelled
them?
C. Third Party Liability Claims
When the claim involves coverage calling for payment, not to the
insured, but rather to a third party for injury or damage caused by an
insured, different public policy issues are presented. It is one thing to deny
recovery to an insured that has misrepresented a material fact, especially if
it was intentional. It may be quite different when the claim is brought by an
innocent third person who may go uncompensated if the insurer is allowed
to deny the claim or rescind the policy on grounds of the insured's
misrepresentation.
A number of courts have held that, "as to innocent third parties, the
insurer could not rescind an automobile liability policy [after an accident]
that it alleged to have been procured by the fraud of its insured." 6s The
63 Id. at 289.
64 Id. at 290.
65 Id.
66 Violin, 406 P.2d at 291 (Zenoff, D.J. dissenting).
67 Id. at 291-92.
68 Nat'l Ins. Ass'n. v. Peach, 926 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
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court in National Insurance Association v. Peach pointed out that the objective
of the state's compulsory automobile liability insurance law was "to insure
continuous liability insurance coverage in order to protect the victims of
motor vehicle accidents and to insure that one who suffers a loss as the result
of an automobile accident would have a source and means of recovery."69
This rule and the rationale thereof have been widely followed and applied
even in states that do not have compulsory automobile liability insurance.7
It is generally held, as was the case in Peach, that even though the insurer
may not rescind as to the injured third party, it may still deny a claim by its
insured for indemnification if the insured has paid the third party's claim.
71
The insurer may also seek indemnification from its insured after the insurer
has paid the third party's claim.72
Perhaps the most cited case in this area of the law is Barrera v. State Farm
MutualAutomobile Insurance Company.73 In Barrera, an injured pedestrian sued
State Farm to recover the amount ofajudgment against State Farm's insured
motorist. State Farm denied the validity of the policy, on grounds of the
insured's material misrepresentation, and cross-complained seeking a
declaration that the policy was void ab initio.74 The California Supreme
Court held
that an automobile liability insurer must undertake a reasonable
investigation of the insured's insurability within a reasonable period
of time from the acceptance of the application and the issuance of a
policy. This duty directly inures to the benefit of third persons
injured by the insured. Such an injured party, who has obtained an
unsatisfied judgment against the insured, may properly proceed
against the insurer; the insurer cannot then successfully defend
upon the ground of its own failure reasonably to investigate the
application.75
69 Id. at 861. The court cited a number of cases in other jurisdictions with compulsory
automobile liability insurance laws which, without exception, have held "that where an innocent third
party has suffered injury from an insured's operation of an automobile, the insurer is prohibited from
rescinding the policy - even where the insurance coverage was procured through the misrepresentations
of the insured." Id. at 861-62.
70 See, e.g., Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674 (Ca. 1969).
71 Nat'l Ins. Ass'n, 926 S.W.2d at 862.
72 Barrera, 456 P.2d at 689.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 677.
75 Id. at 677.
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The court supported its position by pointing to "the 'quasi-public' nature of
the insurance business and the public policy underlying the [state's]
Financial Responsibility Law." 76 The court reviewed a variety of factors
when assessing the reasonableness of an insurer's conduct in the
investigation of the applicant's driving record. These include:
the cost of obtaining the information from the Department of
Motor Vehicles, the availability of this information from the
department or elsewhere..., and the general administrative burden
of making such an investigation. These factors must be weighed
against the importance of the protection of innocent members of the




As demonstrated by the foregoing, public policy is always an important
part of the equation in determining whether to allow an insurer to rescind
a policy or deny a claim. How demanding should we be as to what
constitutes "materiality" and what is deemed to be a "misrepresentation"?
Should we penalize innocent beneficiaries, or third parties who suffer injury
or damage at the hands of the insured? In all of these decisions we must
consider the cost of requiring coverage, because such cost will ultimately be
borne by all of those honest insureds who do not misrepresent, but whose
premiums must be increased to offset the additional payments mandated.
76 Id. at 680-81.
77 Id. at 690.
